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1. INTRODUCTION 
People are a unique resource that affects the long-term potential of the company. According to 
the assumptions of the theory of capital structure, decision-makers are rational, but in the 60s of XX 
century there was an introduction about the assumption of agents’ rationality, i.e. features, 
characteristics and preferences that influence the formation of control strategies. 
According to traditional notions the consumer is rational. He maximizes the utility and minimizes 
costs.  The utility is determined by the amount set and its benefits. So the consumer has a rational 
behavior. In this aspect, we consider the theory of expected utility, according to which we estimate the 
probability of the events with the greatest utility. But the consumer can not perceive all the things and 
events around him rationally as it is influenced by external factors and the internal psychological 
characteristics: his character, memories and experiences. That means that the assumptions about the 
rationality of the individual impugn the theory of the expected utility. 
Not always the consumer maximizes his utility and takes into account the uncertainty. In the face 
of uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about the risks he thinks about his previous empirical experience. 
Irrational perception of information, subjective views and preferences of the individual often lead to 
irrational behavior. This also applies to accessibility of the same information for all investors in its 
sameness of treatment and understanding, as well as the presence of the same goals. 
Also, the individual does not always maximize his expected utility. He does not adequately 
perceive events that are subjective. It is a particular evident when decision-making enhances, increases 
the uncertainty and the complexity of the decision. 
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Investors do not take into account the expected utility. They often do not correctly assess 
probabilities of outcomes, attributing the greatest weight to the least likely events. This is the influence 
of their psychological characteristics, limited information and the impact of previous experience. They 
also tend to the results, where the probability of loss is zero. Investors see outcomes according to losses 
and gains, but not its general welfare. Usually they cannot decide how to act in a particular situation, 
and use abstractions, also based on past empirical estimates. According to psychological and emotional 
characteristics, the individual seems to take rational decisions. He has special internal characteristics 
and preferences. And even if there are factors that refute his preferences, the investor does not 
immediately recognize them. They react strongly to the appearance of new information that leads to 
imbalance in the market, causing a sharp fall of the share price, if, in their opinion, the information is 
bad. 
Sometimes investors are too optimistic about their abilities and knowledge. They are more 
inclined to take risks in the areas in which they are more aware. 
At the same time, investors do not use the instrument of probability theory in making financial 
decisions and expect the probability of events occurrence. And even if they use mathematical methods, 
the sample is not always complete and representative. Also the decisions are affected by the view of 
providing information. Individuals tend to overestimate or underestimate the information according to 
their own views, they may miss important information, but consider meaningful information, which, in 
their opinion, is decisive. Investors and financial participants often build incorrect logical sequence 
about the impact of various factors and events on each other. 
It has been observed that while choosing something the individual receives the influence from the 
surrounding people, so-called effect of the crowd. This can lead to the fact that an individual will not 
consider his own private interests, but the interests of community. The theory of informational cascades, 
according to which, the investor, the financial manager makes choice based on decisions of more 
successful investors or other market participants. 
To overcome the above problems associated with the psychological aspects of decision-making 
the new direction – the theory of prospects authored by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky was created 
(Kahneman D., Tversky A., 1979). They made the following assumptions: the decision of individuals 
should be treated by stages. In the first stage, they should assess the posed problem on choosing the 
solution, dividing it into perspective. Further, they advise to build forecasting function values, attributing 
to each perspective of its probability, which is determined on the basis of subjective and psychological 
characteristics of the individual. Probability is underestimated. So they rely on this function and its 
probability and maximize it. Thus, they make assumptions about the greater importance of individual 
non-absolute utility, not about the relative, which is based on his psychological perception. He pays 
attention to the changes in terms of utility losses and winnings. In this case, the amount of losses is 
overestimated and the value of winning is underestimated. A definite point (defined benefit) is chosen 
to estimate losses and gains. The author also notes that individuals have different perceptions of the 
usefulness changes relative to this point. Smaller decrease in utility is more important for him than the 
bigger one. They found out that the loss is experienced much stronger than a huge resulting gain. 
Therefore, investors tend to make those financial decisions, where the probability of loss is equal to 
zero. This effect is the loss of aversion. But this theory has some problems, for example, if to consider 
small amount of possible prospects, identifying them with the theory of probability is not acceptable, 
and if the amount is large-it is quite possible. 
Behavioral finance theory takes into account the irrational behavior of investors on financial 
markets in the face of uncertainty, due to different psychological characteristics. It examines the 
interaction of psychological characteristics and activities of investors. 
Investors are not fully rational agents. They subjectively perceive information. They often use the 
information that is, in their opinion, the most important, but miss actual important information. They 
follow their beliefs. They perceive the same information differently if it is shown in a different way. 
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Investors build forecasts based on previous data. Financial decision-making also occurs as a result of 
various shapes of the request. For example, investments that have more benefits, shares or bonds, but 
without clarification about the investment horizon. 
Motivation in bringing the various combinations of capital sources is not unique and does not 
depend only on one parameter, which is proved by the results of inspections, when both theories were 
not rejected and new behavioral factors were introduced. 
 
2. THE CONFLICT INFLUENCE OF MANAGERS-SHAREHOLDERS 
Differences in the preferences of shareholders and managers seem to be an objectively 
conditioned phenomenon in decision of persons with different ownership sizes and forms of 
participation in the distribution of income, as well as the difference in the distribution of responsibilities 
and rights in making important strategic decisions for the company. 
Prerequisites of capital structure agency models is the use of equity, in case of corporate 
contradictions debt, in the form of loans, were involved. Complication activity and increased access to 
various sources of capital determines the need to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the application 
of various financing methods. 
Most agency models of capital structure are manager-shareholder's conflict on the assignment of 
the company's funds, increase of benefits, payments and preferences for managers. As a consequence of 
conflicts, so-called agency costs of equity arise, it is related to the implementation costs on monitoring 
and management incentives. According to the model of M. Jensen and W. Meckling such a conflict can 
be minimized by giving the stake, leveling preferences with the owners (convergence of interests), 
contributing to maximize efforts for increasing the company's value, rather than spending the firm's 
assets in personal purposes (Jensen M., Meckling W.,1976). 
Another mechanism for reducing the conflict of agents-principals is the debt financing, which 
indirectly increases the proportion of the voting shares of managers, who are the owners. However, if 
there is a conflict between shareholders and creditors, that increase another type of agency costs - the 
cost of debt. They arise with the lenders guarantees, a higher rate of required income by debt financing 
sources, reduction of investments in projects because of the substantial debt payments. It is necessary to 
identify the optimal ratio of equity cost and the debt cost. 
For Russian companies, a conflict between the interest of manager (risk attitudes, experience, 
reputation, age, remuneration is estimated, who alone makes decisions that not always increase the 
welfare of the company and shareholders, is not prevalent. Management, as a rule, is a major owner, 
exercising control and strategic decision, and it is not considered as a opportunistically configured hired 
manager. Russian companies, unlike other foreign firms, are characterized by different inter-company 
relationships, managers run their own company and at the same time they appear as large owners, or 
majority shareholders directly manage the actions. In terms of high concentration of ownership and 
insignificant management role in the company, the impact of large shareholders, the conflict of interests 
of shareholders - managers have less impact on the funding strategy and the company's performance, 
and they do not exhaustively characterize intra-relationships (Yerznkyan B.H., Krasilnikova E.V., 
Nikonova A.A., 2010). 
Dominating owners do not attract, moreover, can not notify the minority on strategic decisions 
on the company's restructuring, on changes in capital structure; they may be aimed at carrying out its 
own dividend policy. Majority shareholders directly control the cash flows of the company, that allows 
to use or assign the resources of the company by his own preferences, with the withdrawal of "insider 
rents." Minority owners, mainly interested in increasing short-term revenues that contribute to the 
formation of higher dividend payments, as well as in increasing the market value of the shares. 
For example, the impact of behavioral characteristics on investment: managers consider 
themselves to be good professionals, overestimate their performance, identifying shares to be  
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undervalued; overestimate the possibility of getting a return from the investment projects, which leads 
to the increase of debt financing (Graham J., Harvey C., 2001). 
In the case when the director has a share in the company, the trend of increasing of financing debt 
is extended greater if to compare it with the owner-manager. It can be assumed that the presence of a 
shareholder-director has a predominant influence on the formation of capital structure of modern 
companies. "Presumptuous founders of the companies prefer to occupy the post of chairman of the board 
of directors or the company is characterized by the high control action of the General Director from the 
Board of Directors, so that presumption of a chairman has a greater effect on the company's capital 
structure (Dolgopyatova T., 2007 and 2011). 
Concentration of capital is a necessary measure for shareholder's protection, but it is not a rational 
choice in the classical representation of investor's behavior, because it limits the ability to spread risk 
by diversifying the investments. It is assumed that the concentration of capital gives a positive signal to 
investors about the shareholder's confidence, especially if a large pack of shares belongs to managers. 
However, these signals are not stable, since the ownership's term is long, and it is not always associated 
with the current situation. 
Various agency conflicts, availability and appropriateness of certain sources of raising capital are 
associated with the stages of companies' development. Changing the corporate strategic goals and 
objectives, as well as types of conflicts and contradictions are caused by the laws of development, 
accelerated dynamics and changes in cycle stages of organization, that is demonstrated by the studies of 
some agency models theory of capital structure (Diamond D., 1989). Existing life-cycle theory 
advantageously carries out analysis of the dynamics of organizational and managerial characteristics, 
without considering the financial and economic characteristics for each stage of the operation and the 
growth of the company. 
3. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL CONFIGURATION 
A new trend in the corporate sector is competition's growth, the development of the market 
environment and the mechanisms of control of the stock market to stimulate the transition to professional 
management. 
- However, the retreat of the owner from management occurs differently - in companies 
belonging to the holding structure and largely dependent on market signals, as opposed to 
independent firms; there is a significant delegating of the hired management that does not have the 
company's shares. Integration, unification of business groups helps to reduce opportunistic behavior 
by connecting the ownership and control. 
- If the rights of shareholders are not protected, the risk of delegated rights of management 
is rather small. 
- In this situation the amount of investment is less attracted and ownership's interests do 
not always convergence the interests of the company and management. 
- The companies with significant concentration are characterized by a combination of old 
and new managers; with an average concentration – old or new managers; for a low one - only old. 
The connection of ownership and management, with the participation of management in decision-
making is a significant characteristic of Russian companies, as it solves a number of problems caused 
by opportunistic behavior of economic agents and the weakness of the legal framework. 
Management configuration and ownership is also a characteristic of companies' development 
stages, which manifests itself on the early stages of the life cycle, as well as in the final, ultimately, 
affects the further strategy of the company, in particular the involvement of various funding sources. 
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Modern processes of integration, the complexity of technology, business, market and institutional 
environment lead to the separation of ownership and management, attracting hired managers. Behavioral 
factors determine the number of delegation features of functions for different types of businesses. 
Personal characteristics of the founder and managers, the development of their priorities, tendency to 
risk usually is not taken into account for the study of the life cycle of the company and for decision-
making in the face of declining the role of the individual entrepreneur. Not only the organization's 
objectives, the significant terms of innovation and commercial activities are important for the 
development of the company, but also the preferences of top management and the interests of 
stakeholders at various stages. 
Thus, it is assumed that there are prove and sound problems for each stage of development, such 
as difficulties in obtaining funding in the initial stages or overconfidence of the owner to transfer the 
right of management to professional managers. It is recommended to focus on critical situations beyond 
normal limits and features. 
 
4. LIFE CYCLE STAGES 
Life cycle stages were determined on the basis of the work of Dickinson, which determines the 
identity of life cycle stages of the organization not as a scientific approach, but as a result of empirical 
tests, taking into account only the signs of cash flows from operating, financial and investment, without 
using any agency relationship factors or other internal options to facilitate the assignment of the most 
adequate steps (Dickinson V, 2011). In addition, the application of the deduction to the empirical testing 
of the array of companies and partitioning the steps can not reliably characterize each stage, its features 
as the part of the "life" processes in the company. Every stage has special features that reduce the 
relevance of the findings about the relationship between stages. So, each new stage of company's 
development has an accumulated effect of the previous stages, which necessitates the complex research 
of organizations at different stages, not in isolation within each cycle. On the early stages of 
development, in accordance with the author's conclusions, there is a funding from external investors (or 
convertible debt), then - the retained earnings, and at the last stage companies attract new owners or 
long-term loans to finance the following projects. With a low level of retained earnings on the certain 
stage, growth rates are low, but if there is the increase of retained earnings, asset growth increase, 
leverage reaches its maximum threshold, and then falls (Byungmo K., Jungwon S., 2009). 
At the initial stage there are bad financial resources, a difficulty in attracting funding, a lack of 
cash flow, an inadequate system of financial planning - a normal and adequate criterion for this stage, it 
is recommended to focus on previously designated "narrow" places and potential threats. It was noted 
that internal conflicts are associated with the distribution of organizational roles and responsibilities that 
are rather abnormal, it was defined as pathologies that necessitate solutions. Possible reasons are: 
wrongly chosen staff of the company, the unwillingness to work in a team. The threat of incorrect 
organization is the most significant at this stage of the development. 
At the growth stage of the objective there are problems associated with the growth of a high 
quality, the resource allocation system. Organizational characteristics include a lack of adequate 
monitoring and control system. At the stage of maturity a poor provision of financial resources was 
revealed, but there are significant problems associated with the delegation rights, the centralization of 
power hampers, the distribution of responsibilities that determines the possibilities of appearance over 
common problems. 
It requires a systematic approach that takes into account the interaction of agency problems, 
ownership structure, governance, the formation of capital structure; and - methods of decision-making, 
the gradual formation of Russian companies capital structure depends on the availability of agency 
conflicts. 
5. RUSSIAN COMPANIES IN LIFE CYCLE ORGANIZATION 
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For the head of the company of Russian organizations - it is important to identify possible 
contradictions in the development of the company. As we have already defined a significant omission 
of many works that examine different companies and assign one or another particular stage of 
development. But the object of study for the correctness of the findings need to identify a dynamic 
system of organization's development, induction method  is used by most scientists in this area, but it is 
not adequate, since the individual organizations, determined at various stages, do not contribute to the 
relevant general theoretical conclusions about the characteristics of stages, possible threats, as agency 
conflicts, economic and financial risks and it is the most appropriate sources of raising the capital. 
For Russian companies, the determining factor is the impact of the external environment: 
competition, barriers and industry development, institutional characteristics. For domestic organizations 
the duration of their activity and history is lower, which allows to hypothesize the existence of so far 
only three stages: birth, growth, booming. Certainly there are many downturn companies, but mainly 
emerging market countries determine the growth and development possibility opposed to companies in 
developed markets, which have already suspended all main stages, but the stage of decline is typical for 
such firms. 
The author suggests that the main driver and mechanism of the transition from one stage to 
another (for Russian companies) is dominant owner's preferences (external action is also considered, it 
rather affects companies in the transforming economy than in developed one), as it was proofed by the 
results of empirical research (Shirokova G., 2007). In addition, there are differences in the characteristics 
of the stages for the companies with the dominance of foreign owners, which confirms the hypothesis 
about the "owner" type, his interests as a significant development features for organizations with highly 
concentrated ownership, especially Russian. Moreover, the author suggests that nascent desire and 
preferences regarding the growth of the company's owner are realized with a help of internal resources 
(another option to take decisions - the choice not to expand the organization); during the growth stage 
they need external financing for the transition to a new stage of development. It corresponds with the 
findings of the Russian authors about the dilemma of the property owners, the need formalization of 
management for attracting a strategic investors or the separation of management from ownership for 
IPO (Shirokova G., 2007). 
However, they determined that if the property owner makes a decision not to enhance in the 
formalization, not to delegate the rights to management, the growth rate is slowing down, which tends 
to decline. This conclusion corresponds to the representation of I. Adizes about the different roles which 
we assume to be different on different stages of development of the company, focusing on the key 
challenges and problems of growth. 
It may be noted that the main drivers of change and evolution, the transition from one stage to the 
other are internal factors. However, a sustainable path of development can be influenced by the external 
environment that requires a full survey of the environment. 
Joint dynamic system and characteristics of the development stages, including ownership 
structure, structure and composition of the Board Directors, is the company's financial architecture. 
Analysis of the financial architecture of the organization - is the only one of the parameters, identifying 
and evaluating possible admissible cycles of the company. On the one hand, the financial architecture 
changes, due to the development, the need of organization, on the other hand, its components themselves 
characterize the lifecycle. So, the data parameter can be considered only as one of the criteria for 
identifying the stage. 
The ownership structure is an indicator of the distribution control in the company, which 
determines intercompany relationships and conflicts of interest on the impact of financial and economic 
policies, in particular to raise the capital. 
In the context of the designated financial impact in scientific works they are determined both 
empirically and theoretically by the result of the influence of various types of dominant owners on the 
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performance of the company, the formation of capital structure. And only a few studies connect structure 
and the configuration of the property with the development stage of the company. But even in such 
studies a combination of factors was not assessed, only the individual parameters (Dolgopyatova T., 
2007 and 2011; Stepanova A., Balkina E., 2013). However, it is still difficult to clearly assess the effects 
of the influence of ownership concentration, which often determines the possibility of agency conflicts 
between the dominant owners as well as between majority and minority shareholders. On the one hand, 
the concentration of ownership helps to reduce the information asymmetry and to make timely decisions 
under monitoring of shareholder, on the other hand, to abuse corporate control, a limit of qualified 
management for shaping the policies (Jensen M., Meckling W.,1976). Other studies have determined 
the concentration of ownership due to different life cycles and company indicators, revealing a U-shaped 
dependence on the stage of maturity and opposite in the growth stage, and while downturn, the 
concentration improves the features (Stepanova A., Balkina E., 2013).  
Authors verify the hypothesis that there is a mutual control when there are two major property 
owners, which leads to reduce the probability of opportunism and the positive impact of concentration 
(Dolgopyatova T., 2007 and 2011). In addition, on the base of theoretical assumptions of Greiner about 
possible organizational obstacles in the development of the company, we can assume a positive effect 
of ownership concentration at the developing stage company, the birth stage, as a way to overcome the 
threats and the growing risk with the presence of a common goal and convergence of interests of large 
and small owners. The hypothesis on reducing the risk of appearance of agency conflicts when the 
presence of several large owners was empirically was confirmed by the author. 
For small organizations with further development at the stages of rapid growth the "owner's trap", 
reluctance to delegate its powers to the hired professional management, the desire to exercise control 
over its decisions is possible, which is common for Russian internal (agency) relationship. 
Manifestations of conflicts of interest during the presence of two major shareholders on key growth 
stage, in author's opinion, is less significant at this stage of development. For large companies with 
significant development the risk of contradictions of large owners in future strategies, the struggle for 
control is typical. 
Thus, identifying possible threats appearance of agency conflicts, it is necessary to take into 
account the size of the company. For a small organization contradictions which are normal for a large 
one, appear with a certain lag, or they are original, so it requires a different approach and analysis based 
on the size or significant industry-specific. 
At the stage of maturity in small companies, the owner has a desire to receive a benefit from its 
activities and the effort, the so-called "investor's trap", in large ones, on the contrary, the majority 
shareholders after contradictions in the redistribution of control and ownership are focused on the 
implementation of mutual monitoring, but the dissonance (gap) of preferences with minorities increases. 
While extending the share owned by one majority shareholder and his benefits that exceed the received 
cash flows from discrimination, his opportunism and abuse reduces. 
Moreover, there is the least predictability of transition from maturity to decline stage, when the 
company is in the prime of different scenarios of further development: modifications, innovations that 
help to develop the growth stage in this direction or the standardization of activities that naturally lead 
to the downturn. 
Growth stage, in addition to maintaining the current rate of growth, investments in working 
capital, requires substantial investment to the fixed assets. It was found that the companies that are in 
the process of growth have a higher sensitivity of investments (elasticity) to the cash flow (Alti A., 
2003). Young companies should have a small share of borrowed funds, and at the stage of booming 
provide dispersed shareholding structure to avoid the crisis associated with the subjective decisions of 
the manager-owner (Ivashkovskaya I., Konstantinov G., Filonovich S., 2004).  
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At the stage of maturity operating cash flow becomes positive, required investments are focused 
on maintaining current operations, investment cash flows increase. A positive relationship of dividends 
and investments was empirically confirmed. At this stage of development the uncertainty decreases, 
monitoring increases. There is a control of risk, Q-Tobin, which characterizes the long-term aspect of 
the company that is more applicable to the construction of models, than the rate of cash flow - on the 
growth stage. 
The approach to the analysis of the company as a dynamic system is being studied, while the basic 
fundamental studies were missed from the survey of prior periods, it was assumed that the organization 
was at the stage of booming and maturity. In addition, the examination of the company during turning 
points seems to be interesting, when there is an inevitable transition to a new stage and identity of the 
internal and external driving forces. 
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Figure 1. Algorithm of transition from one life stage to another 
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Essential challenges in life cycle organization: 
• Indirectly in theories of capital structure and in theory of information asymmetry. 
• Various objects of study of the life cycle (organizational characteristics, personal 
qualities of owners, company's organization, decision-making methods, the financial parameters: 
sales, cash flow, retained earnings, capital structure). 
• Inductive approach reduces the relevance of the results. 
• Each new stage accumulates the effects of previous ones (the research of organizations 
is not isolated within a single cycle, but in the dynamics). 
• Various criteria for the identification of stages and its length (without focuses on 
concentrated capital). 
• Different drivers of transition from stage to stage. 
• Various agency problems at each stage of development. 
• Uneven steps for small and large companies. 
• Distinctive features of development for privatized and new created companies. 
• Delegating functions for hired management as the transition factor to a new stage of life 
cycle is not always conducive for qualitative growth, and the combination of ownership and 
management do not leads to the limited development. 
• Influence of environmental and institutional features during the stages of development. 
• The object of studying is a dynamical system of development organization. 
 
6. MANAGEMENT MOTIVATION 
The question of how to encourage managers and other employees to improve performance of the 
organization as a whole, their actions in particular is rather important. May the company's management 
establish an effective model that takes into account the behavior and preferences of the employees of 
the firm? What are the stereotypes in methods of stimulation and should we devote a considerable 
attention to motivation, because preferences may change and that will require additional ways to 
promote transformation. 
There will be several ways to harmonize insider's interests (managers and directors) with the 
interests of investors. Typically, they are divided into two types, external and internal. External 
mechanisms include, for example, the market of corporate control and manufactured product, production 
factor markets. Examples of internal mechanisms – the system of material incentives for managers, 
insider ownership and ownership concentration. 
There are some standard approaches to stimulate the executives to qualitatively perform its 
functions (Pustynnikova Y.M., 2003): 
1. Managers' compensation is calculated on the base of their qualifications, positions. The goals, 
set by the owner, shall not be considered for the motivation of managers. 
2. Management remuneration depends on the achieved results and objectives, set by the owner. 
The value of performance indicators is estimated, on which managers can affect. 
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3. The stimulation of managers as the owners happens with the provision of different options for 
companies share.  
According to the classical theory, bonus share options are given to reduce the abuses by managers 
and to align their interests with the shareholders. However, an opportunistic solution of the problem may 
lead the manager to other incentives for his own goals, such as expanding its capabilities and something 
else, that is not connected with the value maximization. Evaluation of managers' work by trends in the 
level of corporation shares prices is also possible. It is important to bear in mind that developments are 
affected by internal and external factors; and changes in the price of shares may occur not only in a 
result of actions taken by managers and management decisions. One of the most important ways to solve 
agency problems appears in forming a system of contracts, involving the interests of all participants in 
the agency's relationship. Main objective of the contracts system – risk allocation between the parties 
and ensuring, as far as it is possible, to generate income, in accordance with risk. Sometimes owners are 
taking on some risk, reserving the right of decision in a particular range of issues. In this case, the role 
of the financial manager is reduced. In some cases, all the risk is transferred to managers and 
theoretically they should have the right for any residual income. If the owner transfers all risk to the 
manager director, they should provide shareholders with a fixed income, taking into account alternative 
investments. Managers provide the required income of the capital and the level of rates on alternative 
investments, taking residual income for themselves. 
Owners can also encourage managers to make high-quality work with a variety of incentives 
(higher premiums, share options – then the manager will try to increase the value of a corporation and 
the domestic price of the option); different regulators (secret rating system, and measures to counteract 
the erosion of capital, improving the performance of the Board of Directors); punishment (dismissal, the 
threat of corporation takeover). At the same time ways to encourage management with options, during 
the downturn, is not resultive. For favorable results of management decisions, measured by the the 
proportion of earnings per share, the owners provide managers with premium shares. Stimulation of 
both tangible and intangible, should take into account and limit opportunistic behavior of managers, 
which occurs upon the separation of ownership and control of management. 
 Financing through long-term and short-term liabilities of the company decreases with increasing 
of managerial capacity (ability), measured through the payment of the CEO, the ratio of CEO 
profitability of assets, the number of years in office, the ratio of the number of years in office to the age. 
The increase of 1% payout of CEO leads to low long-term debt by 11%, and short-term - by 38% (Adizes 
I., 2004). However, this does not overlook the internal preferences that are also very important and 
effective. 
We should create such incentives that are oriented on long-term outcome, at the same time it "ties" 
the manager to the company that would become for him not just a place to work, but a special place. A 
component of monetary motivation is important, but not for all manager and directors. Money is a 
measure of an adequate assessment, the measure of respect to the person as a whole. It was noted that 
significant failure is the standardization of motivational and incentive mechanisms, in particular if they 
are strictly formalized, and in case of individual preferences it can not be circumvented. Corporate 
culture of Western-style has the influence on some employees/managers and has the opposite effect, it 
does not unite the community and affects subordination, and people do not share the preferences of 
activities that should strengthen mutual support and guidance for the company. Many traditions, 
according to the survey, are not taken seriously (for example, the tradition of congratulations on the 
birthday and actually, singing songs by the person causes discomfort and tension rather than enhancing 
the reputation and the role in the company, so that his colleagues did not forgot the holiday). 
To identify priorities, we should conduct surveys, observe the behavior. A psychologist, whose 
purpose – reveal preferences, can be perceived as an invasion to the personal space, for many workers, 
the outsider who clarify their preferences, is associated with some upcoming threat by virtue of having, 
apparently, some problems if sided interference was needed. Most acceptable situation is when 
information about revealed preferences and aims is not declared by the owner. If the reputation is the 
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most important thing for the person, and someone want to encourage him, it is better not do this 
explicitly, so that he would not understand that his preferences are well known, that those who build 
ways to stimulate and promote the intangible know about his dreams, weaknesses (if the person is vain 
the best reward for him – a regular praise). 
Anyone who is really significant for the company needs an individual approach. However, there 
is no organization that is able to satisfy all career ambitions of their employees, but if the basic interests 
of the key agents were not implemented, these stakeholders would prefer another firm. Thus, we should 
build the capacity of staff, providing attempts to implement features. 
Motivation can be external or internal, the significance of which is underestimated. There is an 
example, when a successful motivation (motivation from the outside) of the owner is a magnet that 
collects people together, but when the action is over, people are still fragmented. In fact, each of these 
people acted and will act with their inner motives. Indeed, there is nothing that affects like an internal 
attitude. Some people want to raise the status in the eyes of colleagues, that does not require a significant 
investment, but to enhance their activities. Positive emotions also improve the productivity of their 
activity, there is a desire to "go beyond". Surprisingly, such obvious incentives are not seen, as most 
people are accustomed only to material incentives. Another important understanding perspective is when 
the manager sees examples of execution and implementation of other desired capabilities. 
There are many stereotypes and failures in stimulating (Sprenger R., 2004): 
• Managers are focused only on receiving cash payment bonuses (for example – managers of large 
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers corrected reports to inflate the results and to obtain 
significant bonuses). 
• The owners pay attention usually only to the first revealed stimulus of the manager, ignoring others. 
• Successful manager is always successful in all cases (behavioral halo effect – success 
in any single case marks the success of this employee in other cases). 
• If the results are nonpositive, then in the future they will be the same (effect of failure, 
contrast). 
• If there is no result, it is necessary to motivate more; motivation is not always valid. 
• Monetary incentives quick stale; dissatisfied managers constantly feel unsatisfied (as 
the way of obtaining privileges). 
• Welfare and education can change the position, make a person more prone to criticism 
(however, when the status increases, it sometimes leads to the effect of overconfidence). 
• Short-term incentive effect ("How much does the company earn on me, if it can spend 
such large amount on incentives for such efforts?"). 
The example of guaranteed premiums: managers were fully transferred on salaries, increasing 
them by the average monthly premium for the results of the work but awards were abolished. Six months 
later, company's executives noted that the managerial staff stopped working effectively, and returned 
the original conditions. In addition, the irrationality and unpredictability of agents determines that the 
existing postulates and axioms distort the results and simplify the reality, there is the impact of 
behavioral effects, both for investors, managers and owners. 
 
7. EXAMPLES OF THE OCCURRING EFFECTS FOR INVESTORS: 
The effect of "wasted money" 
This effect displays a reluctance to take and withdraw funds from any project that does not bring 
significant benefits. Also, it is typical for large and successful companies that have reached maturity 
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cycle, and who already have new significant competitors, in this case, such organizations do not need to 
diversify their activities, to seek new ways of development and growth factors. This effect is manifested 
in trading. For example, in case of a significant funds investment to the company's share, by which the 
market is fully analyzed, the company's activities, which have predicted the growth forecast, but the 
expectations failed. A trader regrets about the time spent on analysis, he suggests that a detailed analysis 
is realistic at the moment, but it might be in the future, so he refuses to close it. It is easier to keep an 
open mind, than to admit a wrong decision and accept the loss. The example of the unwillingness to 
withdraw money from an unprofitable project is the construction of a water channel Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway Project in the United States, the analysis of project profitability showed the only 
viable option - to close the project, but on the contrary, Congress has increased funding, arguing that tax 
revenues will otherwise be considered wasted. 
The effect "method of information inflow" 
If the investors believe in the truthfulness of the information, they tend to perceive it as the truth 
and to rely on the original information. If they are not confident in the information – they rely on the 
secondary information. This effect refers to unconfident investors, that are not seeking to change, they 
perceive bad news, that mismatched with their notions about the company, and react to them late or in 
a limited extent. Furthermore, this effect is manifested in deals, connected with acquisitions and 
integrations. So, they initially show the primary information, which will interest the customer. The 
remaining components of the treaty are provided with more complete information. 
The effect of "subliminal accounting" 
It is manifested in the fact that the same loss in different situations affects decision-making. A 
typical example is associated with a loss of money or an object whose value is equivalent to that amount. 
In the first case, an individual often buys an object and in the second – he does not. Also, for example, 
the investor has a specific portfolio, the yield of the whole portfolio is negative, while the yield of 
individual company is high, the growth of which, he did not even expect. The portfolio will not be 
reformed. The same situation is seen with the dividend income and exchange difference. 
The effect of "Tom Sawyer" 
This tendency can be manifested in trading (buying shares), employee motivation (to conduct and 
to report - the most difficult task that can be performed only by the nicest staff), free training (you get 
an invaluable experience). It is widely spread in common marketing for promoting products: hired 
buyers stimulate to purchase, praising their goods. 
The effect of "addiction to certainty" taking into account the effect of specular reflection 
The investors, who have recently appeared on the market, rather rely on wins, than to get the loss, 
so they do not cover losing positions. They prefer certainty when choosing outcomes, guaranteeing a 
profit. At the same time, they seek a way to avoid any certainty in the case of loss, even if the unlikely 
chance of success will lead to additional costs. 
The effect of "isolation" 
It lies in the fact that the choice varies depending on how the probabilities are presented. The 
effect of isolation means that investors tend to consider the possibility and the costs, separately. 
The effect is related to the "fact that people do not learn from their mistakes" 
Firstly, due to the fact that the bureaucracy does not imply interest in the analysis and initiative. 
Secondly, a lot of top managers are focused on achieving success, in this case they use the experience 
of the market leaders, repeating their actions, which is not always successful for this particular company 
by virtue of its various features. 
The effect of the "crowd" 
Investor behavior is different if he acts alone, without consulting and focusing on the actions of 
the majority. Example: Californian "Gold Rush." It also assumes that significant price changes are 
associated with the action of crowd effect, it is especially evident in the stability of companies, banks 
during the crisis. 
The effect of "Peak-end" 
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If the stock market is dominated by negative expectations and forecasts, confirmed by analytical 
studies, with the appearance of positive news investors will be skeptical to positive dynamics since it 
was influenced by negative background. 
Below are the behavioral effects, that should be noted while stimulating management/employee: 
The effect of "optimism and faith in the desired" 
Some owners believe that managers, will necessarily act in the interests of shareholders, if you 
just give them bonuses, while they often do not taken into account the fact that the permanent benefits 
tend to be addictive. 
The effects of "certainty" 
Managers would be most preferable to know how and under what conditions, if they can get, both 
tangible and intangible rewards. 
The effects of "illusion of control" 
Thrifty owners have the impression that if they regularly check accounts - they control the 
activities of managers. As a rule, many of the facts are hidden, or not taken into account or hide income 
and expenses. 
It is also important to make it clear to the manager that he is unique, significant for the company, 
and his features are possible to exercise in this particular company (to avoid the transition to a competing 
firm); that he develops the company. 
The effects of "resilience of opinions" 
Owners sometimes mistakenly believe that monetary incentives are the strongest. 
The effect of a "failure" 
Sometimes ways to stimulate are selected incorrectly, that affects the activities and effectiveness 
of the company and it forces owners to refuse non-standard policy incentives. However, it should be 
simply adjusted, based on the personal preferences, determination what is important for the manager. 
The effect of "deviation to positive result" 
Rules are important for owners, and the need to assess the quality of decisions by the 
circumstances of the time when it was taken, for example, the financial crisis or enhancing the company's 
assets, which reduces the free cash flows. 
The method of "receiving the information" 
Owners should first submit to manager's positive information related to their future prospects, 
tangible and intangible, and then - the requirements and conditions of the project, a new job. 
The effect of "subconscious accounting" 
Many owners have a perception that if they pay premiums, they manage the money of the 
company and if they somehow encourage managers or use other methods of motivation,  they attract 
their own resources (own reputation, for example). 
The "Anchor" effect 
The role of memory is important: the manager remembers that he was awarded, what bonus he 
has received, and how he had used it - this is an additional incentive for him in the future to improve the 
results. 
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Thus, a system of incentives and promotion should take into account the material motivation, 
social motivation and corporate motivation. Each manager is focused on achieving the specific result, 
the company's goals for successful implementation of the interests of managers, as well as the company 
should choose the most appropriate behavioral effects of exposure. In addition, there is a transition to 
behavioral economics, expediency of behavioral characteristics of stakeholder: investors, suppliers, 
owners, managers; the need for a course of behavioral and experimental economics in the educational 
process increases. 
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